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Robert T. Brown* 
In the closing decades of the last century and the 
first decades of the present century railways were 
regarded as an ideal means of linking the countries 
of America economically. Clear evidence of this 
aspiration is provided by the attempts —pursued 
over many years, but finally frustrated— to build 
a Pan-American Railway to link North, Central and 
South America, and the efforts of the Farquhar 
group to consolidate and link together railways in 
the southern part of the continent on the basis of 
control of the Brazil Railway Company. 
After noting these pioneering attempts the 
author analyses the most important international 
railway section in South America, and the role 
played by Governments in their construction. The 
financial procedures used for the construction of 
the railways varied greatly — at the expense and 
risk of capitalists from outside the continent, by 
concession holders from outside the continent 
who were given incentives by Latin American 
Governments , by individual Governments them-
selves, and so on — but in almost all cases substantial 
publ ic support was given to these enterprises. 
Nevertheless, errors in administration, such 
as poor commercial and operational co-ordination 
among the countries, and external dependence in 
respect of the most important decisions, seriously 
hampered the use of this expensive infrastructure. 
Some of these problems still persist, and it is 
urgently necessary to overcome them to ensure that 
railways can play their proper role in rapidly 
expanding Latin American trade. This has been 
the objective of the Latin American Railways 
Association (ALAF) since its establishment in 1964. 
*Director of the CEPAL Transport and Communica-
tions Division. 
Introduction 
In 1964 I had an opportunity to devote a year 
to studying transport and its role in the eco-
nomic integration of South America.1 This 
research was carried out taking the continent 
as a single area in order to identify —through 
an analysis of the distribution of population 
and resources, and physical barriers— the 
needs of transport as a factor in integration. 
During my work I was struck by the fact that in 
the Southern Cone there were more than a 
dozen international rail connexions. Among 
the routes I only then learned about, I discove-
red the one which links the port of Antofagas-
ta on the Pacific with Santos on the Atlantic. 
At that moment I decided to make the journey 
by train from ocean to ocean as soon as possible. 
Nine years later, in 1973, the dream material-
ized when, with colleagues from the CEPAL 
Transport Division, I accompanied two copper 
wagons from Antofagasta to Sâo Paulo. The 
copper was transported without any transship-
ments, and the wagons were not opened once 
over the entire journey of 4,216 km.2 The 
stamps affixed by the Chilean customs at the 
beginning of the journey are at present 
exhibited in the office of the Central Secretariat 
of ALAF in Buenos Aires. 
In addition to my surprise at learning, 
in 1964, that there were at least 13 international 
rail connexions in South America, I was aston-
ished to see how little some of them were 
used. With annual traffic of only 50,000 or 
100,000 tons, an international railway cannot 
run economically, and its very existence may 
be difficult to justify. What is the explanation 
for the failure to make use of this physical 
infrastructure? If one proceeds from the 
premise that, at some moment in the past, 
*Paper prepared for the Seminar on international 
Rail Transport held in the Centro de Estudios Superiores 
of the Spanish National Railway Network (RENFE) in 
Madrid, Spain, between 4 November and 7 December 
1978. 
l See Robert T. Brown, Transport and the Economic 
Integration of South America (Washington, The Brookings 
Institution, 1966). 
2 See "Servicios de transporte terrestre internacional 
en los corredores Lima-Buenos Aires y Lima-Sâo Paulo'1 
(E/CEPAL/1007), pp. 249-289. 
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someone realized how useful these connexions 
would be, and was prepared to make the 
necessary investment for their construction, 
is the present low rate of use of the international 
sections due to loss of the visionary thrust of 
the builders? Or have conditions changed, 
leaving infrastructure suitable for another age 
now obsolete? 
In 19641 was unable to pursue by inquiries 
in the search for an answer to these questions; 
but now, in preparing this paper, I have had 
an opportunity to return to them. In this 
research I examined the efforts, dating back 
100 years, to construct international railways 
in South America, and I attempted to recapture 
the vision of their promoters and to determine 
whether as time has passed we have lost 
something fundamental, which might perhaps 
guide us in an age when international railways 
are facing ever-greater challenges. In the first 
place, I followed up an idea which arose in the 
last century, that of a Pan-American Railway 
which would link the United States and South 
America, and the attempts of the United States 
promoter Percival Farquhar, at the beginning 
of the present century, to integrate within a 
single railway system the networks in southern 
Brazil and Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bo-
livia and Chile. I then examined the initiatives 
which led to each of the international sections 
which now exist. 
The results of this research, which I shall 
endeavour to outline here, were a surprise to 
me. Briefly, my conclusions are: 
a) Although there were persons outside 
South America who had a broad vision of the 
role which an extensive network of interna-
tional railways could play in the region, their 
activities led only to the construction of in-
ternational sections which would have been 
constructed even without their intervention. 
b) It was the South American governments 
which, with a clear perception of the value of 
economic co-operation among the countries 
of the region, stimulated and bore the risk of 
the creation of these international links, 
although foreign technology and capital 
—which was mainly European in origin, and 
which in turn was partly used to purchase 
equipment and components manufactured 
in Europe—made their construction possible. 
c) Nevertheless, these same governments, 
after making major sacrifices to create this 
physical infrastructure, failed to ensure that 
appropriate measures were taken to guarantee 
commercial and operational co-ordination 
which make it possible to obtain the expected 
benefits. As will be seen below, even the very 
promoters who perceived the importance of 
instituting such co-ordination, and who for a 
time controlled the entire management of 
various international sections, were unable 
to achieve this objective fully. 
I 
The Pan-American Railway 
For more than half a century the idea of a Pan-
American Railway linking North, Central and 
South America was of particular attraction 
within the inter-American system and in 
professional engineering circles in the three 
Americas. The intellectual inspiration came 
from the United States, but the idea met with 
support throughout the continent. 
There is evidence of independent, but 
almost simultaneous initiatives by three United 
States diplomats who urged the construction 
of a railway which, starting in the southern 
United States, would continue through Central 
America and the Pacific countries of South 
America, terminating in the Southern Cone. 
Between 1870 and 1873, both Francis Thomas, 
United States Minister in Peru, and J. T. Root, 
Minister of Chile, proposed this major enter-
prise to the State Department. The latter used 
the following words: 
"This railway will open the way to progress 
for American enterprise trade and manufac-
tures, and in a multitude of ways would be of 
the greatest financial benefit to the United 
States, without considering the important 
and noble objective pursued, namely the 
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peaceful settlementoftheconstantcivil tumults 
and disputes which have always existed in the 
past..."3 
However, the best-known of all these 
initiatives was that of Hinton Rowan Helper, 
who was United States consul in Buenos 
Aires between 1862 and 1866. It was he who 
had the idea of an intercontinental railway 
when suffering from terrible seasickness in 
the sailing ship carrying him back to New 
York at the end of his stay in Argentina. In 1879 
Helper popularized the idea in his Oddments 
of Andean Diplomacy and Other Oddments, 
followed in 1881 by The Three Americas 
Railways, which contains the prize-winning 
essays and poems from an international contest 
he sponsored on the subject. In his first work 
Helper wrote: 
"The dwellers in those countries have millions 
of square miles of fertile lands and precious 
metals and tropical forests and fruits, and other 
sources ofinexhaustible wealth, the true values 
of all of which we shall help them to develop, 
in a cheerful spirit of ready amenability to the 
great commercial law of demand and supply; 
and, on the other hand, we shall sell to them at 
handsomely remunerative profits to ourselves, 
tens of thousands of carloads of our surplus 
manufactures and our other merchantable 
products, which, while fitly affording them all 
promised gratification, will constantly create 
within them a craving for still newer and 
better things, and will thereby, for the first time 
in their lives, awaken within them the exquisite 
delights of self-regulated and rightful unrest, 
activity and achievement."4 
Helper's ideas fell on fertile ground in the 
United States, since at that time, when the 
construction of railways was proceeding at the 
fastest rate in United States history, the role 
that railways played in the development of a 
country was generally recognized. The wish 
of some circles in the United States to use the 
construction of a Pan-American Railway to 
destroy European domination of Latin Ameri-
3Translated from Santiago Marín Vicuña, Sobre Ferro-
vías Internacionales, (Santiago, Chile, Cervantes, 1928), 
p.6. 
4Rowan Hinton Helper, Oddments of Andean Diplo-
macy and Other Oddmenst, (St. Louis, W.S. Bryan, 1879), 
p. 15. 
can markets, which was to a substantial extent 
due to British control of shipping routes, 
seems rather unrealistic today if one considers 
the distances which have to be covered. 
Nevertheless, bearing in mind the prestige 
achieved at that time by railways as an instru-
ment of political and economic integration, it 
is not surprising that the first International 
Conference of American States, which met in 
Washington from October 1889 to April 1890, 
agreed: 
"First. That a railroad connecting all or the 
majority of the nations represented in this 
Conference will contribute gready to the 
development of cordial relations between said 
nations and to the growth of their material 
interest. 
"Second. That the best way to facilitate its 
realization is the appointment of an Interna-
tional Commission of Engineers to ascertain 
the possible routes, to determine their true 
length, to estimate the cost of each, and to 
compare their respective advantages... 
"Fifth. That the railroad, in so far as the 
common interest will permit, should connect the 
principal cities lying in the vicinity of its route. 
"Twelfth. That the realization of an undertaking 
of such magnitude deserves to be encouraged 
by means of subsidies, land concessions or 
guarantees of a certain minimum interest."5 
Reaction to the Conference's proposal was 
immediate, and the United States Congress 
voted an appropriation of US$ 65,000; still 
more importantly, it authorized the President 
to include officers from the army and navy in 
groups to survey the itinerary of the proposed 
railway. In 1890 the International Commission 
of Engineers met for the first time, and in the 
following year three survey teams were 
dispatched to Central and South America. The 
results and recommendations of the teams 
were published in six volumes in 1899.6 
The route selected by the Commission 
followed that proposed in the resolution 
adopted by the first Interantional Conference 
of American States. Beginning in Ayutla, on 
5Luis Ernesto Denegrí, El Ferrocarril Pan-Americano 
(Lima, Torres Aguirre, 1928), pp. 3-4. 
6John Anthony Caruso, "The Pan American Railway", 
The Hispanic American Historical Review, (Durham, 
N.C.), vol. XXXI, N.° 4 (November 1951). 
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the border between Mexico and Guatemala, 
the route crossed Central America and continu-
ed through Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Boli-
via, terminating in La Quiaca, on the border 
between Bolivia and Argentina (see map). In 
general, it made use of the already existing 
railways, and connected the main centres of 
population in the Andean region, but the route 
had the drawback of running parallel to the 
Pacific Coast, in addition to requiring engi-
neering works in the Andean chain. Concerning 
this route, Charles M. Pepper, a fervent 
advocate of the intercontinental railway, wrote 
in his 1904 report presented to the United 
States Congress by President Theodore 
Roosevelt: 
"It will arrive in Quito, the start of the 
road which, in the time of the Incas, linked 
Quito to Cuzco, the Imperial City, 1,900 miles 
away. Leaving Quito behind, the traveller 
will skirt the base of the gigantic Chimborazo, 
then climb its side to a height of 12,000 feet, 
as if climbing a mountainous ladder step by 
step, since these transverse masses known as 
nudos are the characteristic features of the 
Andes in Ecuador. He will enter Peru by the 
Sabanilla Pass, crossing and recrossing from 
the Pacific to the Atlantic slope, between 
precipices and glaciers at an altitude of 13,000 
or 14,000 feet, until he arrives in the mining 
area of Cerro de Pasco at 14,300 feet, one of the 
highest human settlements in the world, from 
whence, alternately rising and descending, 
he will arrive in Cuzco, the old Inca capital, at 
an altitude of 11,000 feet, and will continue 
onwards, by a relatively flat route, to Puno, on 
Lake Titicaca, at 12,540 feet/'7 
This description was to cause concern to 
7Translated from Santiago Marin Vicuna, Política 
ferroviaria de la América (Santiago, Chile, Imprenta 
Universitaria, 1927), p. 32. 
anyone interested in financing the operations. 
In the words of the Peruvian engineer Luis 
Ernesto Denegrí, who argued in favour of the 
original route at the Sixth International 
Conference of American States, held in Havana 
in 1928: 
"Reading Mr. Pepper's dantesque description, 
one would think that the Pan-American Railway 
had been planned not by men desirous of 
linking peoples together, but by demons 
anxious to lead us by railway up hill and down 
dale, shivering from the proximity of the eternal 
snows and the lashes of icy winds, and at every 
instant having the terrifying vision of imminent 
avalanches and fathomless precipices in which 
it appears impossible not to fall; anxious, I 
repeat, to lead us to the highest altitudes on 
earth, only to hurl us to the abyss, yawning 
below like some new hell, where we are to 
atone for a new sin."8 
The Second International Conference of 
American States, held in Mexico in 1903, 
endorsed the resolution adopted by the First 
Conference, and also set up a Standing Com-
mittee. Discussion of the subject continued, 
both in this Committee and at succeeding inter-
American conferences, up to the 1930s. 
Nevertheless, it became increasingly evident 
that the railway was never going to be built, 
despite the efforts of the Argentine engineer 
Juan A. Briano, from 1919 onwards, to shift 
the route towards the interior of the continent 
(see map). The Pan-American Railway re-
mained the dream of a few romantic diplomats 
and engineers, and 50 years of activity failed to 
materialize in the form of the construction of a 
single kilometre. 
8Denegri, op. cit., p. 103. 
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ROUTES PROPOSED FOR THE PAN-AMERICAN RAILWAY 
Route proposed by the 
International Commission of Engineers 
- O - O - O - O - O O Route proposed by Juan A. Briano. 
^ > 
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II 
The Farquhar group 
One of the most fascinating episodes in the 
history of Latin American railways is made up 
of the efforts of a group of United States and 
Canadian promoters, led by Percival Farquhar, 
between 1906 and 1913, to consolidate a railway 
system in southern Brazil and extend it to 
Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and 
Chile. Financing was carried out through the 
London capital market, but the capital itself 
originated mainly with French and Belgian 
investors. This episode helps us to gain an 
idea of the view held by foreigners on the role 
of railways in the development of South Ameri-
ca at the beginning of the present century. 
Percival Farquhar arrived in Rio de Janeiro 
in 1905, after building railways in Cuba and 
Central America. He was struck by the fact that 
the railway system in Brazil consisted of 
unconnected lines to ports, without adequate 
connexions one to another in a north-south 
direction. He pointed out that, by consolidating 
the lines in southern Brazil into a single system, 
he could apply the model of the Canadian 
Pacific railway in Canada, which had already 
been tested with success, since a number of the 
railway concessions also included huge 
concessions of land which Farquhar considered 
suitable for settlement.9 
In November 1906, Farquhar set up the 
Brazil Railway Company in Portland, Maine, 
as a holding company which eventually 
controlled 38 other companies.10 One of 
Farquhar's firstacts was to use his new company 
to purchase the Joaquim Catramby concession 
in order to build the Madeira-Mamoré railway, 
an international railway on the border between 
Brazil and Bolivia which would solve the 
problem of the rapids which made navigation 
impossible on the river Mamoré.11 
Construction of this railway lasted from 
9Charles A. Gauld, "The Last Titan: Percival Farquhar, 
American Entrepreneur in Latin America", Hispanic 
American Report (Standford University, California), 
special isue, 1964, pp. 161-167. 
wibid., p. 233. 
"/fcid., p. 126. 
1907 to 1913, and cost US$ 33 million at that 
time (equivalent to about US$ 250 million 
today), or about US$ 90,000 per kilometre. 
The work, in one of the most dangerous 
Amazonian areas, cost the lives of 3,600 men, 
and only by annually engaging more than 8,000 
workers was it possible to maintain a work 
force of 2,700.12 It was this successful and 
dramatic effort which firmly established 
Farquhar's reputation in South America. 
However, of greater interest to us are his 
activities in the far south of Brazil. In 1906 
Farquhar paid US$ 1 million for 94% of the 
shares in the Sào Paulo-Rio Grande railway, 
which at that time was still incomplete and 
would not produce any return for a long time 
to come. It ran northwards from Ponta Grossa 
in Paraná to the border of Sao Paulo State, near 
Itararé, and southwards to Uniáo da Vitoria on 
the river Iguaçu, crossing it by what was at 
that time the longest bridge in Brazil to reach 
Porto Uniao, in Santa Catarina State. The 
railway ended there, but there were conces-
sions to extend the line southwards, across 
the unpopulated forests of Santa Catarina to 
the town of Marcelino Ramos on the river 
Uruguay. Of greatest interest to Farquhar was 
the land concession held by the railway in 
Paraná and Santa Catarina, totalling 2.4 million 
hectares, and he immediately began the 
extension of railway, reaching Marcelino 
Ramos in 1910.13 
In 1907 Farquhar leased from Sao Paulo 
State, for 60 year, the Sorocabana railway, more 
than 1,000 kilometres long, thus obtaining a 
direct line to Sao Paulo. In 1908 he gained 
control of two railways competing with the 
Sorocabana: 27% of the Companhia Mogiana 
de Estradas de Ferro e Navegaçâo (1,180 km), 
and 38% of the Companhia Paulista de Vías 
Férreas e Fluviais (925 km). In 1910 he added 
to his Brazil Railway Company the Paraná 
railway, which ran from Ponta Grossa through 
imid.,pp. 132 and 145. 
13J¿> id., p. 166. 











































































































Source: Frederick A„ Moiitor, Report on the Railway Properties in Southern Brazil leased, owned or controlled by the Brazil Railway Company 
(New York, John Ward and Son, 1915). 
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Curitiba to the port of Paranaguá, the Dona 
Teresa Cristina railway, the Norte do Paraná 
Railway and the Sul de Sao Paulo railway.14 
Also in 1910, Farquhar purchased more 
than 70% of the shares, and thus gained 
control, of the 2,100 km system belonging to 
the Compagnie Auxiliaire des Chemis de Fer 
du Brésil which served the State of Rio Grande 
do Sul. This railway connected with the Sao 
Paulo-Rio Grande railway at Marcelino Ramos, 
and had already extended its lines up to 
Uruguaiana, on the border between Argentina 
and Brazil. As a result of the construction and 
consolidation of lines in Brazil, including the 
new line to the border with Uruguay, a direct 
service between Sao Paulo and Montevideo 
was begun in 1913.15 
His success in Brazil induced Farquhar to 
look towards the neighbouring countries. In 
1912 he set up the Argentina Railway Company, 
which also had its headquarters in the State of 
Maine. This new company offered US$ 70 
million to the Government of Argentina for the 
acquisition of the State railways, but the Gov-
ernment demand US$ 100 million, together 
with an undertaking to standardize the gauge 
of all the lines. Although Farquhar did not 
succeed in reaching agreement, the Argentine 
Government supported his idea of centralizing 
control of the railways north of Mesopotamia. 
Farquhar immediately gained control of the 
Ferrocarril Entre Ríos, the Ferrocarril Noreste 
de Argentina, and the Ferrocarril Rosario y 
Puerto Belgrano, which he consolidated with 
the Ferrocarril Central Córdoba.16 
Despite this success, there were heated 
protests in Argentina at this interference in the 
national railways by the United States pro-
moter, and the reaction was not limited to 
Argentina, but was substantial in Brazil also. 
This was partly due to Farquhar's acquisition 
of control of the Ferrocarril Central del Uru-
guay, which gave him a line between Monte-
video and the border towns of Rivera and 
Mlbid., pp. 172-176. 
l5Ibid., p. 178. 
16Simon G. Hanson, "The Farquhar Syndicate in 
South America", The Hispanic American Historical 
Review, {Durham, N.C.), vol XVII, N.° 3 (August 1937), 
p. 321. 
Livramento. Meanwhile, in London Farquhar 
gained control of the Ferrocarril Central de 
Paraguay, which was still being built between 
Asunción and Encarnación.17 In 1912, at the 
climax of his efforts to consolidate the railways 
in the Southern Cone, he acquired a large 
share in the Antofagasta to Bolivia railway 
through his Bolivia Railway Company. His 
aim at that moment was to extend a new line 
across Paraguay in order to build a transcon-
tinental railway. Nevertheless, the following 
year he sold his shares at a very substantial 
loss.lb 
Farquhar did not restrict himself to buying 
railway concessions and lines to consolidate 
an international system: following the suc-
cessful model used in Canada, he also sought 
to settle the land along his railways in order to 
generate demand for freight which would 
make them pay. 
For this reason, he had great interest in 
the land included in the railway concessions 
in Brazil, and on the basis of such concessions 
established colonization companies. These 
companies developed the areas with greatest 
economic potential, selling land to colonists 
from Europe and other parts of Brazil. As a 
complement to development based on 
settlement in Brazil and Paraguay, Farquhar 
saw the potential of livestock raising and the 
timber industry. In 1910 and 1911, Farquhar 
opened large sawmills in Brazil to process 
Paraná pine destined for the markets of Sao 
Paulo, Montevideo and Buenos Aires, while 
in 1912 he constructed the first meat packing 
plant in Osasco, some 10 km from Sao Paulo 
on the Sorocabana railway. In Paraguay, 
through such companies as the Paraguay Land 
and Cattle Co., and the Compañía Industrial 
Paraguaya, Farquhar obtained huge stretches 
of land, about 5 million hectares, and set up 
meat packing plants.19 
By the end of 1912, Farquhar controlled 
an enormous empire of railways, ports and 
land.2"* In Brazil alone he estimated that he 
17Gauld, op. cit., pp. 239-241. 
18Hanson, op. cit., p. 323. 
19Gauld, op. cit., pp. 209-221. 
^The diagram reproduced below indicates the 
complex financial structure which still existed in 1915. 
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had invested about £ 45 million,21 which, taking 
into account inflation between 1912 and 1978, 
would amount to some US$ 1,700 million 
today. Even so, the Brazil Railway Company 
was seriously underfinanced, because of the 
losses inevitably incurred by the subsidiary 
companies in livestock raising, land settlement 
and timber, which required a long gestation 
period. Keeping the empire going was possible 
only through new infusions of capital, but the 
capital market in Europe on the eve of the first 
world war was not favourable. Farquhar 
himself was speculating in shares in the Brazil 
Railway Company, and at the beginning of 
1913 realized that he was personally ruined.22 
Furthermore, the Brazil Railway Company, 
the owner and operator of a rail system covering 
more than 4,300 km, with an interest in a 
further 2,400 km, had largely been financed 
through the sale of bonds instead of shares; in 
1914 it could not pay the interest on them, and 
passed into the hands of a receiver from the 
State of Maine.23 Farquhar's empire had 
collapsed, and with it disappeared too the 
possibility of realizing the dream of an integra-
ted railway system in the Southern Cone of 
America. 
Il l 
Identification of the international railways 
It is clear, from this summary of the experience 
of the promoters of a Pan-American Railway 
and the effort of Percival Farquhar to consoli-
date an international railway system, that 
despite the emphasis of these men on integra-
tion, these episodes led only to the construction 
of connexions which would have been built 
in any case. Although foreign capital was 
frequently indispensable, and although the 
example of railways as driving forces of 
development in other continents had served 
as an inspiration, the thrust in favour of the 
construction of international railways did not 
come from outside the continent, but from 
within the South American countries them-
selves. 
Before exploring in greater detail the role of 
South American governments in the construc-
tion of the international railways, it is necessary 
to identify the sections which can be considered 
as genuine international railways. Thus, for 
example, although a railway exists between 
Valparaiso and Buenos Aires, the sections 
between Valparaiso and Los Andes, and be-
tween Buenos Aires and Mendoza, were built 
for the purpose of national integration. In the 
case of the section between Buenos Aires and 
Mendoza, one of its objectives was to direct 
towards the ports of Buenos Aires and the 
Paraná river the trade which previously used 
Pacific ports.24 This does not mean that the 
governments did not have such a vivid aware-
ness of the role of international railways as 
foreign diplomats, engineers and promoters, 
but merely that the railway would have been 
built to Mendoza in any case, even if it had been 
impossible to extend the line into Chile. 
Accordingly, identifying the international 
railways is not easy, since the criterion used is 
not whether they are used for international 
traffic or not, but the reason for which specific 
sections were constructed. Even in the appar-
ently very clear case of the railway between 
Tacna, Peru and Arica, Chile, from this point of 
view it is notan international railway, since both 
towns belonged to Peru when the railway was 
completed in 1856, and it was not converted into 
an international route until 1929, when the 
border between the two countries was fixed 
between these two localities. 
The table below shows the 13 border 
connexions which will be examined in this 
study; it also attempts to identify the sections 
built largely in order to provide an international 
21 Hanson, op. cit., p. 319. 
22Gauld, op. cit., pp. 247-248. 
^Ibid., pp. 255 and 263. 
24Eduardo A. Zalduendo, Lífcras y rieles (Buenos Aires, 
Ei Coloquio, 1975), p. 352. 
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aIncludes 204 km. of lake crossing between Puno and Guaqui. 
''Via the 1.676 in. gauge San Martin railway between Mendoza and Buenos Aires. By the 1 in.gauge Belgrano railway the distance is 
1.636 km. 
cIncludes a 67.8 km. ieny crossing to Zarate. When the bridge for rail traffic is open the distance will be shorter. 
"Via Marcelino Ramos. 
eBy the 1.676 ni.line between Tuciimán and Buenos Aires. By the 1 ni gauge line the distance is 2.119 km. 
•Estimated distance. 
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL RAILWAYS / Robert T. Brown 17 
SOUTH AMERICAN RAILWAYS CONTROLLED BY THE FARQUHAR GROUP AROUND 1912 
service. As will be seen below, this classifica- the section is part. In order to indicate the 
tion is sometimes arbitrary, and in more than geographical setting ofthe various connexions, 
one case it is certainly erroneous. The table also sections and routes within South America, the 
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IV 
Role of governments in the construction of the 
international sections 
An analysis of the planning and construction of 
the international sections identified in the text 
above shows that, with a few exceptions, these 
sections were the result of the efforts of the 
governments of South American countries. 
Until the last decade, which saw the emergence 
of such initiatives as the creation of LAFTA and 
the agreements for the construction of the 
binational dams in the River Plate Basin, it was 
no exaggeration to say that these sections 
represented the best example in the continent of 
economic co-operation among developing 
countries. Indeed, in some eases where inter-
ests from outside the continent played an 
important role, such as the trans-Andean rail-
way between Los Andes and Mendoza, the 
result of the intervention of the foreign compa-
nies was actually prejudicial to the countries, 
and it was not possible to secure significant 
benefits until the governments took over the 
management of the sections. 
The reasons which prompted the govern-
ments to undertake these major enterprises in 
economic co-operation ranged from some self-
interested local pressure to obtain railway links 
of local benefit to the attitude of those who saw 
international railways as the motive for Latin 
American integration and development. Among 
the latter, few could surpass in enthusiasm 
Guillermo Rawson, the Argentine Minister of 
the Interior, when he wrote in 1870: 
"When we have constructed the scarcely two 
hundred leagues that separate us from Chile, an 
immense revolution will have taken place in the 
commercial routes of the world. Then it will be 
necessary to widen the streets and highways of 
Buenos Aires so that there will be room for the 
masses of human beings, made up of all races 
and laden with the infinite variety of their 
wealth, who will comfortably transact their 
business , leaving behind them among us the 
trail of gold and of light which the civilization of 
this century displays in its most splendid 
manifestations."25 
Nevertheless, the fact that the governments 
have continued to construct international sec-
tions up to the presentindicates that the existing 
connexions are not solely due to temporary 
enthusiasms of the past. 
Since the management, financing and 
construction of some of the international sec-
tions do not differ greatly from those of the 
national railways, it appears useful to summa-
rize the three principal ways of carrying out 
these activities in South America since the 
middle of the past century. The first, and 
probably the most widespread in the countries 
of the River Plate Basin, took the form of 
concessions to private companies accompanied 
by substantial State incentives and subsidies. 
Under this formula, a promoter sought a State 
concession for the construction and operation of 
a railway line. Sometimes, the line formed part 
of a State plan for railway construction, while at 
other times the promoter himself planned it. 
T h e typical concession granted an implicit 
monopoly on transport in the area served by the 
new line, and involved exemptions from cus-
toms duties for materials imported for its 
construction. I t also frequently happened that 
the government guaranteed interest on the 
capital invested on the line for a certain number 
of years, so that if the profits on the line did not 
reach the rate of return laid down, the govern-
ment paid the difference. Finally, the conces-
sion frequently included the granting of large 
areas of land adjacent to the line, which the 
holder of the concession could settle, in order to 
increase traffic on the new line. Under the first 
formula, the promoters, bank agents and con-
^Marín Vicuña, Política ferroviaria de la América, 
op. cit., p. 61. 
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struction contractors had their profits practical-
ly guaranteed, and returns on the capital of the 
investors —generally European— were assured 
for 20, 40 or more years, under the State 
guarantee of minimum interest on the capital. 
The second manner of approaching the 
construction of national railways, and one 
which was applied in particular in the Pacific 
countries, was direct investment by the State, 
frequently financed by loans obtained by the 
governments inEurope. Under this formula, the 
government undertook the construction of the 
new line and operated it on its completion, 
although subsequent problems occasionally 
made it necessary to sell or lease the line to a 
private company for operation. 
T h e third formula was less widely used in 
Latin America, and was applied almost exclu-
sively in the case of what might be called 
industrial railways serving mineral deposits. In 
these cases, concessions were granted to private 
companies forthe construction and operation of 
railways, but without State guarantees relating 
to capital invested or other important subsidies; 
the entire risk in construction was borne by the 
private company, and it would be correct to say 
that the existence of this type of railway was due 
to private initiative. 
Against this general background on nation-
al railways, we will now examine the inter-
national sections identified above. Of particular 
interest in this study is the role of the govern-
ments and the financial arrangements and 
distribution of risk between the governments 
and the private companies. The basic objective 
is to determine how far the section in question is 
the result of economic co-operation among 
Latin American countries. 
a) International sections constructed by 
and at the risk of capitalists 
from outside the continent 
None of the 13 international railway sections 
identified in the previous part could be describ-
ed as primarily the result of an initiative by 
capitalists from outside the continent with full 
acceptance of the risks involved. All the sections 
owe their existence to subsidies granted by the 
governments to the holders of concessions orto 
direct efforts by Latin American governments 
and individuals. 
The sole case which might be considered 
an exception was the change of gauge from 0.76 
m to 1 m effected by the Compañía Antofagasta-
Bolivia on the Antofagasta-Uyuni section be-
tween 1926 and 1928, in order to link it with the 
Bolivian and Chilean systems.26-27 
(b) International sections constructed by 
concession holders from outside the 
continent which were given incentives 
by Latin American governments 
The international section from Los Andes to 
Mendoza, which is part of the transcontinental 
route from Valparaiso to Buenos Aires, is a good 
example of a section constructed by concession 
holders who received substantial guarantees 
from the two countries involved, Chile and 
Argentina.28 In 1872, the Anglo-Chilean broth-
ers Mateo and Juan Clark secured from the 
Argentine government a concession for the 
construction of a railway from Buenos Aires to 
the Chilean border, with interest guaranteed at 
7% for 20 years. Two years later, the Chilean 
government authorized the construction of the 
section in Chilean territory, but as a result of 
certain financial problems the start of work was 
postponed. In 1882 the Ferrocarril de Buenos 
Aires al Pacífico was set up in London, acquired 
the Clark brothers' concession for the section 
be tween Buenos Aires and Mendoza, and 
initiated the construction work; the first loco-
motive reached Mendoza from Buenos Aires in 
1887. In the same year the Compañía del 
Transandino Argentino began construction 
from Mendoza to the Chilean border, reaching 
Las Cuevas in 1903. 
^Br i an Fawcett, Railways of the Andes (London, Allen 
a n d U n w i n , 1963), p. 119. 
27 Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica y la 
integración económica regional (United Nations publica-
tion, Sales N.° S.72.II.G.4), p . 132. 
2 f iZalduendo, op. cit.; Fawcett, op. cit.; United Nations 
(CEPAL), Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamé-
rica..., op. cit.; INTAL/CEPAL, Servicios de transporte 
terrestre..., (E/CEPAL/1U07), op. cit.; R. Simón, M. Araya 
and J. S. Contreras, Informe sobre la situación del Ferro-
carril Transandino Chileno (Santiago, Chile, Imp. Nasci-
mento, 1927). 
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On the Chilean side, the Clark brothers 
encountered various financial problems, and 
the Law of 1874 was replaced in 1887 by a more 
favourable law, which made it possible for work 
to begin in 1889. Nevertheless, despite new 
changes in the concession in 1893 and 1895, a 
combination of political and financial problems 
in Chile prevented the line from advancing 
beyond El Salto del Soldado. Finally, a new law 
in 1903 granted guaranteed interest of 5% for 20 
years on a capital of £ 1,485,000 and, with the 
reorganization of the company holding the 
concession, which was converted into the 
Transandine Construction Company Ltd., the 
work continued and the link was made with the 
Argentine section in 1910. 
T h e international section between Monte 
Caseros, Argentina, and Cacequi, Brazil, is 
another example of an international railway 
whose construction was due to subsidies 
granted to the concession holders by the govern-
ments concerned. Monte Caseros was selected 
as the starting point of the international section 
to Brazil because the section between Concor-
dia and Monte Caseros had been established in 
1875 as an isolated railway designed to avoid the 
waterfalls which impede navigation on the river 
Uruguay. The initial concession for the line 
be tween Concordia and Monte Caseros was 
authorized in 1864 in a law passed by the 
Argentine government, and it was granted in 
1869 to an Argentine citizen, who sold it to a 
company established in London, the Compañía 
Ferrocarril del Este. The concession enjoyed a 
State guarantee of 7% a year for 40 years.29 
T h e section between Monte Caseros and 
Paso de Los Libres, where there is a connexion 
with the Brazilian section between Cacequi and 
Uruguaiana, is part of the concession granted to 
Juan Clark by the Argentine Government in 
1872 for the construction of an 812-km railway 
from Monte Caseros to Corrientes and Posadas. 
T h e concession included a State guarantee of 
6% for 20 years. In order to carry out the 
undertaking the Compañía Ferrocarril Noreste 
Argentino was set up in London, and in 1890 
completed an initial 65-km section. According 
2 9Raúl Scalabrini Ortiz, Historia de los ferrocarriles 
argentinos, 4th ed. (Buenos Aires, Ed. Plus Ultra, 1964), pp. 
341-342. 
to indirect information, the section to Paso de 
Los Libres was completed between 1890 and 
1900, while the extension to Posadas, opposite 
Encarnación, in Paraguay, was completed be-
tween 1900 and 1910.3<> Later the Compañía 
Ferrocarril del Este and the Compañía Ferro-
carril Noreste Argentino were consolidated into 
a single company, which took the name of the 
latter.31 
In Brazil, the section between Uruguaiana 
and Cacequi is part of the line from Porto Alegre 
to Uruguaiana, construction of which was de-
cided upon by the Imperial Government of 
Brazil in 1873.32 The nature of the initial 
concession is not clear from the materials 
available in the CEPAL Library, but it is to be 
supposed that it included a State guarantee of a 
certain level of interest on the capital invested. 
In 1898 the Federal Government of Brazil 
leased the line between Porto Alegre and 
Cacequi to Alfonso Spée, who in turn trans-
ferred the concession to the Compagnie Auxil-
iaire des Chemins de Fer du Brésil, a Belgian 
company authorized —also in 1898— to operate 
in Brazil. In 1905 the Compagnie Auxiliaire 
received another concession to complete the 
construction of the section Cacequi and Uru-
guaiana,33 which it did in 1910. In the same year 
Percival Farquhar purchased 70% of the shares 
in the Compagnie Auxiliaire,34 while in 1912 he 
acquired control of the Compañía Ferrocarril 
Noreste Argentino,35 Nevertheless, only in the 
1940s was the dual-gauge international railway 
bridge between Uruguaiana and Paso de Los 
Libres completed.36 
A third example of an international section 
constructed as a result of subsidies paid to the 
concession holders is the section which links 
Brazil and Uruguay through Santa Anna do 
Livramento/Rivera. It is easy to define the 
^ Z a l d u e n d o , op. cit., pp. 335-336 and 577. 
3 1 Scalabrini Ortiz, op. cit., p. 339. 
^Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica..., 
op. cit., p. 136. 
3 3Frederick A. Molitor, Report on the Railway Proper-
ties in Southern Brazil Leased, Owned or Controlled by the 
Brazil Railway Company (New York, John Ward &c Son, 
1915), pp. 60-61. 
3 4GauId,í>p.ctí . ,p. 178. 
3 5Hanson, op. cit., p. 321. 
^Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica..., 
op.cit.yp. 137. 
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international-section on the Brazilian side, since 
it is a branch which leaves the line between 
Porto Alegre and Uruguaiana at a point named 
Entroncamento, near Cacequi. The concession 
obtained by the Compagnie Auxiliaire in 1905, 
whose exact terms are not known, provided for 
the construction of this branch to be com-
pleted.^7 
On the Uruguayan side, in contrast, it is 
more difficult to define the international section 
since this forms part of a line which leaves 
Montevideo and continues directly northwards 
to Rivera, so that it is impossible to know which 
section was constructed only to carry national 
traffic and which was constructed to create a link 
with the Brazilian railway system. The Ferro-
carril Central was organized in Uruguay in 1863, 
and in 1869 the section between Montevideo 
and Las Piedras was opened, but in 1876, 
because of financial difficulties, the Compañía 
Ferrocarril Central del Uruguay was set up in 
London to operate the Montevideo-Durazno 
concession. In 1884, law N.° 1751 on railways 
routes guaranteed companies holding conces-
sions interest of 7% a year for forty years. Under 
this law, the Ferrocarril Central extended its 
line to Rio Negro, which it reached in 1886. 
Later, the line was extended to Rivera, a sector 
which the Ferrocarril Central was granted a 
concession to operate in perpetuity.38 :)9-4() 
Although there is no doubt that the Govern-
ment of Uruguay provided subsidies for the 
construction of the international section, identi-
fication of the length of the section is arbitrary, 
since it is not possible to find convincing 
reasons for deciding on one cut-off point rather 
than another. For the purpose of this study 
Tacuarembó, a livestock centre, has been fixed 
as the end of the Tacuarembó-E ntroncamento 
section. 
In 1912Percival Farquhar acquired control 
of the Ferrocarril Central de Uruguay and built a 
37Molitor, op. cit., p . 61. 
^ Z a l d u e n d o , op. cit., p . 415. 
•^Joseph L. Fitzmauriee and Hardy Osgood, The 
Railways of Uruguay (Washington, U.S. Department of 
Commerce, [1942] ), p . 4. 
"""Uruguay. Administración de Ferrocarriles del Estado 
y Comisión de Inversiones y Desarrollo Económico, 
Diagnóstico del transporte ferroviario (Montevideo, 1966), 
p . 2 3 . 
railway bridge between Livramento and Ri-
vera.41 
(c) International sections constructed 
directly by governments 
The international section between Augusta 
Victoria, Chile and Salta, Argentina is perhaps 
the best example of a case where two Govern-
ments decide on the construction of an inter-
national railway as a means of economic co-
operation, with each country directly financing 
its share in the total costs. This section was first 
officially approved in Argentine in 1896, when a 
commission was appointed to study the route. 
Originally both Governments had hoped to 
construct the section by means of concessions, 
and to that end in 1907 they separately autho-
rized Emilio Carrasco to link Salta and Antofa-
gasta using the Huaytiquina pass. However, 
Carrasco's efforts were unsuccessful, and his 
concession on the Argentine side lapsed in 
1914:12 When his concession in Chile was to be 
renewed for the third time, a serious conflict 
rose be tween the Executive and the Congress of 
Chile in 1912, when "there suddenly arose 
great alarm among the livestock fatteners and 
producer of fodder and meal, who were alarm-
ed and afraid of losing the northern market for 
their products..."43 
Following continued local pressure by the 
Salta producers and the Antofagasta mineral 
products consumers, the decision to construct 
the section was formalized in an agreement 
signed in 1922 by Ernesto Barros Jarpa, Chilean 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Carlos M. 
Noel, Argentine plenipotentiary. The agree-
ment provided for the simultaneous construc-
tion of the Antofagasta-Salta connexion and 
another in the south, between Lonquimay, 
Chile and Zapala, Argentina, thus reducing the 
opposition of the Chilean producers in the 
south to the connexion in the north. In the same 
41 Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica..., 
op. cit., p . 136. 
42Proyectos multinacionales de infraestructura física. 
Fórmulasjuridico-administrativas (Buenos Aires, Instituto 
para la Integración de América Latina, 1970) pp. 222-223. 
4 3Marín Vicuña, Política ferroviaria de la América, op. 
cit., p . 63. 
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year a protocol was signed which laid down a 
policy for the fixing of railway tariffs.44 
In 1929 a joint Argentine-Chilean commis-
sion specified the technical characteristics of 
the section, bu t construction was slow. In 1943, 
under the Fernández-Storni Agreement, the 
two countries reaffirmed their agreement to 
speed up the construction work. Finally, gov-
ernment agencies completed the construction 
using the Socompa pass —some 200 km south of 
the Huaytiquina pass— and starting on the 
Chilean side from Augusta Victoria, 152 km 
from Antofagasta on the line belonging to the 
Compañía Antofagasta a Bolivia. The line was 
opened in February 1948.45 
T h e second case of an international section 
constructed by two governments working 
together is the section between Atocha, Bolivia 
and Jujuy, Argentina. On the Argentine side, a 
concession was granted in 1889 to Julio Achával 
y Cía., for the construction of the section 
be tween Jujuy and La Quiaca, but the conces-
sion lapsed in 1894.46 Information available in 
C E P A L indicates that the section was cons-
tructed by the Argentine State as part of 
Ferrocarril Central Norte Argentino, but it does 
not indicate the date of its completion. 
O n the Bolivian side, construction by the 
State of the section between Villazón and 
Tupiza began in 1912 and ended in 1924. 
Construction of the section between Tupiza and 
Atocha, also by the State, lasted from 1920 to 
1925. Meanwhile, the section between Atocha 
and Uyuni had already been completed in 1913, 
by the Ferrocarril Antofagasta a Bolivia.47 
The category of sections constructed direct-
ly by the State also includes the section between 
Juliaca, Peru and La Paz, although this is a 
special case. On the Peruvian side, the line from 
Moliendo to Juliaca, built by the Peruvian 
Government and completed in 1876,48 has not 
been defined as an international section, since 
the l ine continues to Cuzco and would probably 
have been constructed even if it had not been 
4 4 Ibid., p. 65. 
45Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica..., 
op. cit., p . 140. 
4 6 Zalduendo , op. cit., p . 580. 
4 7 Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica..., 
op. cit., pp . 138-139. 
4*Ibid.,p. 132. 
possible to use it for international traffic. This 
line passed in 1890 to the Peruvian Corporation, 
a company set up in London by the holders of the 
unpaid bonds of the Peruvian State.49 
On the Bolivian side, construction of the 
section from Guaqui to La Paz was begun in 
1901, with financing from the Departamento de 
La Paz. When national finance ran out, the work 
continued using a loan from the Peruvian 
Corporation, reaching El Alto in 1903. In 1904 
the section was leased to the Peruvian Corpora-
tion, which completed construction all the way 
to La Paz. In 1910, the section was sold to the 
Peruvian Corporation.50 
(d) International sections constructed with 
financing from another Latin American 
country 
Of particular interest for the present study from 
the viewpoint of economic co-operation among 
developing countries are those international 
sections which were constructed as a result of a 
contribution made by one Latin American 
country to another.51 The decision of two 
countries to construct a railway to link them is 
in itself an example of economic co-operation, 
b u t if in addition one of the countries provides 
financial assistance to the other, this gives it a 
special character. In 7 of the 13 international 
sections examined here, one of the countries co-
operated in financing construction in the other. 
In chronological order, the first case is the 
international section between Antofagasta, 
Chile and Uyuni, Bolivia. Construction began 
in Chile in 1872, when the Compañía de Salitres 
y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta, a company formed 
by Chilean shareholders, obtained a concession 
for the construction of a railway to the interior 
and for exploitation of the saltpetre deposits. In 
1882, when the railway had reached a point 150 
km from Antofagasta, the Chilean Government 
authorized its extension to the Bolivian border, 
4 9 C Reginald Enock, Peru (London, T. Fisher Unwin, 
1908), pp. 104-105. 
5 0Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica..., 
op. cit., pp . 132-133. 
5 1 This does not mean that economic co-operation 
among developing countries should be identified with 
concessional assistance; co-operation should essentially be 
beneficial to both parties. 
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on condition that it provided a public service. 
The Bolivian Compañía Huanchaca co-oper-
ated with the Compañía de Salitres y Ferrocarril 
de Antofagasta in financing the extension to the 
mines in the interior of Bolivia, and in 1888 the 
Bolivian Government authorized an extension 
to Uyuni, which was completed in 1889, a year 
after the formation in London of the Antofagasta 
(Chile) and Bolivia Bailway Co. Ltd. This 
company bought the Chilean section and the 
Compañía Huanchaca concession, which in-
cluded the extension of the line to Oruro with 
State-guaranteed interest of 6%.52 
Since the Antofagasta-Uyuni section was 
originally a saltpetre railway, and currently 
carries heavy traffic from the Chuquicamata 
copper mine in Chile, objections may be made 
to its inclusion as an international section of the 
total length of the line between Antofagasta and 
Ollagüe. Nevertheless, it is felt that the enor-
mous effort required to convert the original 
gauge of 0.76 m to 1 m between Antofagasta and 
Uyuni constitutes a justification. This conver-
sion, carried out between 1926 and 1928, in 
addition to movement of the rails themselves 
over 614 km, involved the modification of the 
bogies of 61 locomotives, 103 passenger 
coaches and 2,140 wagons in the Mejillones 
workshops, and was carried out without any 
interruption to traffic, except for six days in July 
1928.S3 
The international railway section between 
Arica, Chile and Viacha, Bolivia was cons-
tructed by Chile in pursuance of the 1904 Treaty 
of Peace and Friendship between Chile and 
Bolivia, the pertinent section of which reads: 
"Art. 3. In order to make closer the political and 
trade relations of the two Republics, the High 
Contracting Parties agree to link the Port of 
Arica with El Alto de La Paz by a railway, which 
will be constructed by the Government of Chile 
at its expense, within a period of one year from 
the ratification of the present Treaty. 
"Ownership of the Bolivian section of this 
52Fawcett, op. cit., pp. 112-113; Los ferrocarriles 
internacionales de Sudamérica..., op. cit., pp. 131-132; 
Humberto Aldazosa Villamil, Los ferrocarriles de Bolivia 
(La Paz, mimeo, 1977), p. 2; Francisco A. Encina and 
Leopoldo Castedo, Resumen de la historia de Chile 
(Santiago, Chile, Zig-Zag, 1970), pp. 1408-1414. 
^Fawcett, op. cit., pp. 118-121. 
railway will be transferred to Bolivia on the 
expiration of a period of fifteen years from the 
day on which it is totally completed. 
"To the same end, Chile undertakes to pay the 
sums which may be incurred by Bolivia for 
guarantees of up to 5% on the capital invested in 
the following railways, construction of which 
may be undertaken within a period of thirty 
years : Uyuni to Potosí; Oruro to La Paz; Oruro to 
SantaCruz, via Cochabamba; La Paz to the Beni 
region; and Potosí to Santa Cruz, via Sucre and 
Lagunillas. 
"This undertaking shall not involve for Chile 
expenditure of more than one hundred 
thousand pounds sterling a year, nor more than a 
total of one million seven hundred thousand 
pounds sterling, established as the maximum 
which Chile will pay for the construction of the 
Bolivian section of the railway from Arica to El 
Alto de La Paz and for the guarantees mentioned 
above, and it shall expire and be null and void on 
completion of the period of thirty years indi-
cated above."54 
Construction was initially entrusted to the 
Sindicato de Obras Públicas de Chile, a compa-
ny formed using national capital, for the sum of 
£ 2,152,000. When this company could not 
fulfil the contract, the work was entrusted in 
1909 to Sir John Jackson (Chile), Limited, of 
London, represented in Chile by Mateo Clark, 
for¿ 2,750,000 -£. 1,645,000 for the Chilean 
section and £ 1,105,000 for the Bolivian sec-
tion. The railway was opened in 1913.55 
Although the international section of the 
line between Paso de Los Libres, Argentina and 
Asunción, Paraguay, has some characteristics of 
a section constructed by concession holders 
from outside the continent with financial sup-
port from Latin American governments, there is 
one element which justifies its inclusion in the 
present category. Paso de Los Libres has been 
fixed as the end of the section on the Argentine 
side, on the assumption that the extension 
between that point and Posadas was made 
principally with the aim of linking up with the 
Paraguayan railway. The history of the cons-
54 Alberto Decombe, Historia del ferrocarril de Arica a 
La Paz, (Santiago, Chile, Lib. e Imp. de Artes i Letras, 1913), 
p. 9. 
55Ibid., pp. 87 and 112. 
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truction of the section has already been exam-
ined in the course of the description of thé 
section from Monte Caseros, Argentina to 
Cacequi, Brazil, 
On the Paraguayan side, the section be-
tween Asunción and Encarnación began as the 
Ferrocarril del Estado. In 1861 the first section 
to Trinidad (6.4 km) was opened, and in 1864 the 
line reached Paraguari, 72 km from Asunción.56 
The railway was subsequently sold to Luis 
Patri, a Paraguayan, who repaired the damage 
caused by the War of the Triple Alliance, and 
later sold the railway to the Government in 
1886, retaining a contract for the extension of 
the line to Villarrica. However, construction 
was held up by the absence of State financing.57 
In 1889 the Paraguay Central Railway 
Company Limited was established in London 
and purchased the existing line, agreeing with 
the Government to extend the line to Encar-
nación with a guarantee of 6% interest.58 In 
the same year the first train covered the 150 
km between Asunción and Villarrica.59 The 
new company began construction in Encar-
nación, but in 1891 work stopped again at 
250 km because of lack of finance, giving rise 
to litigation which lasted for 15 years, and 
ended only in 1907 with the reorganization 
of the company and a new agreement with the 
Government which made it possible to restart 
construction.60 Finally, in 1913, when Percival 
Farquhar controlled the Ferrocarril Central de 
Paraguay, the line reached Pacú-Cúa, beside 
Encarnación, where the rolling-stock crosses 
the river Paraná on a ferry to continue from 
Posadas to Buenos Aires. Farquhar himself 
was on the train which inaugurated the direct 
service.61 
^Estudio sobre el Ferrocarril Central del Paraguay, 
Secretaría Técnica de Planificación del Desarrollo Econó-
mico y Social, (Asunción, 1964), (mimeo), p . 1. 
5 7Gaylord Warren Harris, "The Paraguay Central 
Railway, 1856-1889", Inter-American Economic Affairs 
(Washington), Vol. 20, N.° 4, (Spçing 1967), pp. 15-17. 
™Ibid., pp . 20-21. 
5$Estudio sobre el Ferrocarril Central del Paraguay, 
op. cit., p. 2. 
mIbid., p . 2; Gaylord Warren Harris, "The Paraguay 
Central Railway, 1889-1907", Inter-American Economic 
Affairs (Washington), Vol. 21, N.° 1, p. 35. 
6 1Gauld, op. cit., p. 241; Hanson, op. cit., p. 322. 
This short outline of the history of the 
section from Paso de los Libres to Asunción 
indicates that the section should be classified in 
the category of railways links constructed by 
concession holders from outside the continent 
with support from the State. One might also 
wonder why the final point of the Paraguayan 
section is Asunción instead of Villarrica, but 
there are reasons for this. 
Towards the end of the last century, during 
the litigation between the British Company and 
the Government of Paraguay, Argentine capital-
ists (including shareholders in the Ferrocarril 
Noreste Argentino, which runs to Posadas) 
acquired shares in the Ferrocarril Central de 
Paraguay. In 1906 the Argentine shareholders 
had 85% of the shares, while the bonds re-
mained largely in British, French and North 
American hands.62 Furthermore, the Paragua-
yan railway was built with a broad gauge of 
1.676 m, which would have prevented a con-
nexion to Buenos Aires without transship-
ments. In 1911-1912 the gauge was changed to 
1.435 m, thanks to a contribution from the 
Government of Argentina of £ 380,000, in 
exchange for deferred bonds worth ¿ 220,00o.63 
The international section between Treinta 
y Tres, Uruguay and Basilio, Brazil is a particu-
larly clear example of economic co-operation 
between developing countries. A 1918 agree-
ment between Brazil and Uruguay, modified by 
another in 1928, established Uruguay's remain-
ing debt to Brazil in respect of the War of the 
Triple Alliance and laid down that it should be 
applied to the construction of an international 
railway section between Treinta y Tres and 
Basilio. The first point was the northern termi-
nal of a branch of the Ferrocarril Central del 
Uruguay, and the second a point on the Bra-
zilian line between Cacequi and Rio Grande. 
The construction work, including the Mauá 
bridge on the river Yaguarón between Rio 
Branco, Uruguay and Jaguarao, Brazil, was 
completed in 1931.64 
6 2Harris, "The Paraguay Central Railway, 1889-1907", 
op. cit., p. 40. 
^Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Súdame rica..., 
op. cit., p . 135. 
MIbid., p . 137. 
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The Brazilian part of the international sec-
tion between Campo Grande, Brazil and Santa 
Cruz, Bolivia was initially conceived as part 
of the feeder line which would link the State 
of Matto Grosso with the coast of the country. 
The 1890 Plan de Viaçao Férrea e Fluvial 
(Railway and River Transport Plan) laid down 
special incentives for the constructions of 
railways to Corumbá and other distant points in 
the interior, including a transport monopoly for 
60 years, guaranteed interest of 6% for 30 years 
and land grants 20 km wide along the entire 
length of the lines.65 At all events, when 
construction from Baurú was finally com-
menced in 1905, there was probably a clear 
intention to build a railway link with Bolivia: 
indeed, the extension from Campo Grande to 
Corumbá was only justifiable with that in mind. 
Construction was slow, and only in 1926 was the 
bridge over the river Paraná completed, while 
the bridge over the river Paraguay was not 
finished until 1947.ee 
Construction on the Bolivian side was fi-
nanced by the Government of Brazil. The 1903 
Treaty of Petrópolis obliged Brazil to construct 
at its own expense the Madeira-Mamoré rail-
way, with a branch to Villa Bella, a Bolivian 
village on the river Mamoré, and to pay Bolivia 
an indemnity of «i2 million.67 By the Flores-
Pacheco Protocol OÍT925, which apparently was 
not ratified, Brazil agreed to use this indemnity 
to construct the section from Santa Cruz to 
Corumbá, provided that Bolivia did not delay 
construction of the section between Cocha-
bamba and Santa Cruz.68 In April 1928, using a 
loan of US$ 6 million from Dillon Read & Co., 
the Government of Bolivia engaged the firm of 
Kennedy & Carey, of New York, to reconstruct 
the section from Cochabamba to Cliza and 
extend the line to Aiquile, 220 km from Cocha-
bamba towards Santa Cruz.69 Under the Decem-
6 5 Zalduendo, op. cit., p . 215. 
66'Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica..., 
op. cit., p . 141. 
6 7 John Henry Merryman, The International Agree-
ments of Bolivia as they Relate to Transportation. Prepared 
in Conjuction with the Bolivia Transport Study (La Paz, 
Stanford Research Institute, 1968), p . 14. 
^ M a r í n Vicuña, Sobre ferrovías internacionales, op. 
cit., pp . 17-18. 
6 9"Bolivia —Ministerio de Fomento— Contrato de 
ber 1928 treaty between Bolivia and Brazil, it 
was agreed that Brazil would not construct the 
branch to Vijla Bella, but would undertake to 
assist in financing the section from Cochabamba 
to Santa Cruz.70 Nevertheless, construction did 
not continue beyond Aiquile. 
In 1938 the Treaty on Railway Links 
between the two countries stipulated that Brazil 
would devote half the indemnity laid down in 
the Treaty of Petrópolis to the construction of 
the section between Corumbá and Santa Cruz, 
and that it would lend Bolivia the difference 
between that sum and the actual cost of cons-
truction, to be repaid by Bolivia over 20 years 
following the completion of the work. Construc-
tion began in Corumbá in 1939, and in 1954 the 
line reached Santa Cruz,71 althouth the bridge 
over the Rio Grande in Bolivia was completed 
only in 1958. In 1964, under a further protocol, 
the two countries agreed that Bolivia's debt 
would be invested, by common agreement, in 
development projects in eastern Bolivia which 
could benefit from the presence of the 
railway.72 
The international section from Embarca-
ción, Argentina to Santa Cruz, Bolivia origi-
nated in a 1906 agreement between the two 
countries which provided foran extension of the 
line of the Ferrocarril Central Norte Argentina 
to Yacuiba and over a further 100 km in Bolivia 
towards Santa Cruz, and also provided for a 
system of guarantees for construction up to 
Santa Cruz.73 Althouth the line reached the 
border, implementation of the agreement 
within Bolivia was not successful. 
The possibility of extending the railway to 
Santa Cruz arose again in 1922, when another 
agreement between Bolivia and Argentina was 
signed in La Paz stipulating that the Argentine 
Government would construct the line without 
requiring immediate expenditure by the Boli-
vian Government. In fact, the agreement 
granted a generous concession to Argentina for 
construcción", Boletín de la Sociedad de Ingenieros de 
Bolivia (La Paz), Vol. 4, N.° 11 (December 1928), p . 57. 
7 0Merryman, op. cit., p. 16. 
7Hbid.,p. 16. 
^Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica..., 
op. cit., p . 141. 
™Ibid.,p. 139. 
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the operation of the railway on its completion, 
althoug article 4 stated that: 
"The Government of Bolivia may at any time 
acquire ownership of the line, once it and its 
branches have been completed, by paying the 
total value of its cost and interest at 6% a year on 
the capital invested; however, until such time as 
this value has been repaid, the Argentine 
Government will be responsible for the admin-
istration and management of the line, on the 
same terms as those which would apply to a 
private company, withoutprejudice to the rights 
inherent in Bolivian sovereignty."74 
However, the agreement was not ratified. 
Finally, under the Preliminary Railway 
Convention of 1937, a joint commission was set 
up to carry out engineering studies on the 
extension of a line to Santa Cruz and branch to 
Sucre, while under another convention in 1940, 
Argentina agreed to advance funds for the 
section between Yacuiba and Villa Montes. 
These agreements were consolidated in 1941 in 
the Treaty on Railway Links, which, in addition 
to establishing an Argentine-Bolivian Joint 
Railway Commission, to be responsible for all 
the railway works, laid down the terms on which 
Bolivia would repay with petroleum or cash the 
credits granted by Argentina.75 
Construction of the line began in 1944, and 
in 1957 the line reached Santa Cruz, althouth in 
a temporary state in some sections. However, in 
1958 a flood destroyed the bridge over the river 
Parapeti, and it was necessary to change part of 
the route. In 1966 regular service was initiated 
between Santa Cruz and Buenos Aires, and in 
1967 the line was officially handed over to the 
Government of Bolivia.76 When construction to 
Santa Cruz was nearly completed, both coun-
tries agreed to extend the line to the town of 
Trinidad in the Amazonian region. At present 
the railway reaches the river Yapacani, some 
204 km from Santa Cruz. 
Construction of the Salto Grande dam on 
the river Uruguay made possible an internation-
al section between Salto, Uruguay and Concor-
dia, Argentina, since this enormous construc-
tion, costing some US$ 1 billion, includes an 
international road and railway over the dam. 
The work began in 1974, and the opening of the 
railway section is planned for 1979; this will 
make it possible to integrate the Paraguayan 
railway with that of Uruguay via the Argentine 
line between Posadas and Concordia. Although 
a substantial part of the cost of the dam is being 
financed with a loan from the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) and suppliers' 
credits, the Argentine Government is financing 
the local currency costs, which will be repaid by 
Uruguay in the future in the form of supplies of 
electricity.77 
V 
Administration of the international sections 
As can be seen from the preceding section, it 
was the South American governments them-
selves which promoted or constructed the in-
ternational railway links, bearing the financial 
risks and, sometimes, financing construction 
work in other countries. This approach of 
economic co-operation reflected a clear idea of 
the role which could be played by an interna-
tional railway and the benefits which its con-
struction brought with it. The following table 
indicates the two principal purposes of the 
various sections. 
7 4 Marín Vicuña, Política ferroviaria de la América, 
op. cit., pp . 122-128. 
7 5Merryman, op. cit., p . 7 
7QLos ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica..., 
op. cit., p . 139; Merryman, op. cit., p . 7; Comisión Mixta 
Ferroviaria Argentina Boliviana, Construcción Ferrocarril 
Santa Cruz-Trinidad. Informe de la gestión 1974-1975, 
p . 4 3 . 
7 7Uruguay - Administración de los Ferrocarriles del 
Estado, "Las interconexiones ferroviarias sobre el Río 
Uruguay", Revista ALAF, Vol. 1, N.° 21 (April-June 1976). 
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Asunción-Paso de los Libres 
Jujuy-Atocha 
Treinta y Tres-Basilio 
Augusta Victoria-Salta 
Campo Grande-Santa Cruz 
Embarcación-Santa Cruz 
Salto-Concordia 
Regrettably, after major efforts to provide 
suitable physical infrastructure to achieve the 
purposes set out above, two fundamental errors 
were committed in the administration of the 
sections, which often made it impossible to 
obtain the hoped-for benefits. Firstly, each part 
of the railway was allowed to be administered 
independently, with little commercial and 
operational co-ordination; secondly, the direc-
tors and principal staff of the private companies 
holding concessions were allowed to centralize 
the most important decisions abroad, so that 
local power to take decisions remained very 
limited. 
Dividing the administration of interna-
tional sections between two companies has 
especially serious consequences, since each 
side of these sections is often, in turn, an unim-
portant branch within the national railway 
network, and the border connexion itself is 
often located in an inhospitable place. Opera-
tional and commercial co-ordination, in these 
circumstances, is difficult, and is generally 
carried out at a middle or low level in the hi-
erarchy, so that as a result it does not reflect a 
decision by the senior management of the com-
panies to use the railway as a fundamental tool 
for expanding international trade and econom-
ic integration 
Without wishing to embark on an analysis 
of the particular cases of each international 
section, it is worth while giving a few illustra-
tions. The railway between Arica and La Paz 
was administered as a single company for 15 
years by Chile until, under the 1904 Treaty, 
ownership and administration of the Bolivian 
sectors was transferred to Bolivia in 1928. 
Although the purpose of the railway is to give 
Bolivian imports and exports access to the port 
of Arica, this fragmentation of the administra-
tion led to the creation of two classifications of 
freight and the separate payment of freight 
charges in each country. 
In the case of the railway between Augusta 
Victoria and Salta, the Chilean side was admin-
istered by the Antofagasta to Bolivia railway 
between 1948 and 1965. The agreement be-
tween the company and the Government of 
Chile stipulated that FCAB wagons would not 
enter Argentina, which made it necessary to 
transship the freight at Socompa on the border. 
The Additional Protocol on Zonal Trade, signed 
by Argentina and Chile in 1957, set up a Joint 
Commission whose functions would include 
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the fixing of tariffs, "bearing in mind the pur-
poses of developing trade and the mutual 
supply of goods for which it was constructed", 
the exchange of rolling-stock and the general co-
ordination of both sections; however, this 
commision never met.78 
Earlier in this study reference was made to 
the efforts of Percival Farquhar to consolidate 
into a single system the railways in southern 
Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile and Argenti-
na. Farquhar grasped very clearly the impor-
tance of co-ordinating international railway 
operations and services and establishing a 
commercial policy which would encourage 
traffic. After securing control of the Compagnie 
Auxiliaire de Chemins de Fer du Brésil, which 
had connexions with Argentina and Uruguay, 
he cut tariffs by 15% with the aim of stimulating 
traffic,79 probably partly because it was the 
Buenos Aires and Montevideo markets for 
timber which would make his large sawmills 
in southern Brazil profitable. As noted in the 
previous section, it was Farquhar who in 1912 
built the bridge between Livramento, Brazil 
and Rivera, Uruguay. Nevertheless, when in 
1915 Frederick Molitor, adviser to the receiver 
of the Brazil Railway Company after its bank-
ruptcy, prepared his report on the situation of 
the railway, he wrote as follows concerning the 
Livramento-Rivera connexion: 
"In consignments destined to Uruguay, the 
shipper bills to Sant'Anna and is obliged to 
employ a broker there to attend to the rebilling 
over the Uruguay railways. Facilities for trans-
fer exist between these two railways of different 
gauge, but the stations are four and a half miles 
apart. There is a switching rate between them 
which amounts to about US$ 20.00 per car at 
the present rate of exchange. In consequence of 
this prohibitive rate, lumber is unloaded on the 
sidings of the Auxiliaire at Sant'Anna and 
hauled piecemeal to Rivera over a wagon road 
only three miles long, then reloaded on the 
Uruguay railway cars - all at half the cost of rail 
transfer. 
"Despite the fact that this connexion with the 
Uruguay Railway, controlled by the Brazil 
78Proyectos multinacionales de infraestructura fí-
sica..., op. cit., pp . 224-225 
7 9 Hanson, op. cit., p . 317. 
Railway Company, has been in existence for a 
number of years, no effort seems to have been 
made even to assist through traffic that is seek-
ing to use the lines. Thus, the lack of co-
ordination before mentioned extends to inter-
line shipments, and until this is remedied the 
Brazil Railway Company cannot hope to in-
crease its earnings. Such local business as the 
Company enjoys is almost forced upon it, and 
interline business is effectively prevented."80 
Thus, in this case not even the visionary 
Farquhar managed to introduce commercial 
procedures and practices which would revital-
ize the international railway, even though he 
controlled the railways on both sides of the 
border. 
It was mentioned above, on the subject of 
the section between Concordia and Monte Ca-
seros, that the concession granted to an Argen-
tine in 1869 by the Government of that country 
was immediately sold to the Compañía Ferro-
carril del Este, a British firm. The sale of the 
concession provoked objections in Argentina, 
and in 1871, when the Ferrocarril del Este 
requested approval of its articles of incorpora-
tion, the Procurator General prophetically 
pointed out in his report the drawbacks of 
administrative centralization outside the coun-
try: 
"The transfer substantially alters the terms of 
the concession. The concession was made to a 
person resident in the Republic and domiciled 
in Buenos Aires. Today the contractor is a 
private company formed in London, and it will 
set up a very expensive board of directors in 
London, which will prepare the accounts there 
in pounds and which will even have to pay the 
British Government tax on income from a line 
situated in the Argentine Republic. The inev-
itable result will be questions and arguments 
similar to those already arising today between 
the Government and the Compañía del Central 
Argentino. The considerable salaries which 
the directors award themselves, although in 
reality they direct nothing, because it is impos-
sible to watch over the administration from 
2,000 leagues away; the unlawful tax paid to 
the British Government and discounts in the 
80Molitor, op. cit., p . 263. 
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remitting and exchange of money, which ab-
sorb a large part of the proceeds and which the 
Government will have to offset; and also the 
fact that this situation will place Argentines 
who wish to buy shares in the Company in an 
intolerable position."81 
Nevertheless, the articles were approved. 
Perhaps the clearest example of the results 
of dividing the administration of an interna-
tional section between two companies, and 
allowing them to maintain residence abroad, is 
that of the trans-Andean railway between Los 
Andes, Chile, and Mendoza, Argentina. The 
fact that this is a classic case justifies a rather 
detailed description of how it was operated in 
the initial period. 
Section IV above contained an examination 
of the financing and construction of the railway, 
and the reasons which led to the setting up of 
two companies separately answerable to the 
Governments of Argentina and Chile. What 
happened after the opening of the line in 1910 
is very well summed up by the Chilean engineer 
Santiago Marín Vicuña, who wrote in 1927. 
"Something anomalous, which should be noted 
and explained, has occurred in the operation 
of this line: the expected economic benefits 
for our country have been relatively small, if 
they are compared with the monetary sacrifices 
which the State has been obliged to bear. 
"This was due to the undesirable and unac-
ceptable fact that the Chilean and Argentine 
sections constitute separate companies which 
—though this may seem paradoxical— had 
opposing interests, since once the administra-
tion of the latter section had been entrusted to 
the railway from Buenos Aires to the Pacific, 
the financial interests of this company lay in 
hampering trans-Andean traffic to Chile. 
"As a result, because of a curious and irritating 
tariff-fixing system, the products from Men-
doza province had to travel 1,043 km to Buenos 
Aires, instead of coming only 387 km to Valpa-
raiso. And to make this imposition even more 
flagrant, there were goods with a higher tariff 
between Los Andes and Mendoza than between 
81Scalabrini Ortiz, op. cit., pp. 341-342. 
Los Andes and Buenos Aires, so that a partial 
journey cost more than the whole!"82 
Obviously, this had not been the intention 
of the two Governments when granting the 
concessions and guaranteeing interest on the 
capital invested.Accordingly, afterthe line had 
been opened, Argentina and Chile appointed a 
commission which met in 1911 to study a tariff 
structure which would stimulate international 
traffic and to arrange a fair distribution of freight 
between the two Andean railway companies. 
On the completion of their meetings the dele-
gates proposed the establishment of a Standing 
International Commission to study and resolve 
the problems of the trans-Andean railway. The 
results of the 1911 meetings were summarized 
in the Informe sobre la situación del Ferroca-
rril Transandino Chileno, ordered by the Chi-
lean Minister of Communications in 1927, in 
the following words: 
"The result of the 1911 conferences may be 
outlined as follows: The question of splitting 
the freight between the companies remained 
pending. The trial tariffs were not put into 
practice, and the Standing International Com-
mission was never appointed. As a result, each 
company continued to charge the tariffs which 
it had already established..."83 
The problem of drawing up tariffs which 
suited both countries remained unsolved for 
the next six years, until it was agreed to submit 
the question to the joint arbitration of the 
Governments of Argentina and Chile, with the 
appointment of a commission which met in 
1917. Nevertheless, the only issue on which a 
decision was sought was that of the splitting of 
the freight between Los Andes and Mendoza, 
and the level of the tariff was not brought up. 
The arbitration commission drew up a formula 
based on the work necessary to pull the train, 
which calculated the compensated distance of 
ascent in each section and applied the real 
distance in the case of a descent. As the 
compensated distance of ascent was calculated 
at 940 km (185 real km) in the Argentine section 
and 780 km (71 real km) in the Chilean section, 
the splitting formula was: 
82Marín Vicuña, Política ferroviaria de la América, 
op. cit., p. 50. 
^Simón and others, op. cit., p. 31. 
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Argentine trans-Andean quota 
Chilean trans-Andean quota 
1120O + iM0Qa + 180Oc 
850Q + 780Qc+ 70Qa 
where Q is the total dead weight of the trains 
which have made the trip during a period of 
several months, Qa is the freight tonnage from 
Mendoza to Los Andes and Qc the freight 
tonnage from Los Andes to Mendoza.84 The 
formula was frequently recalculated to take 
into account variations in the imbalance in 
traffic in each direction. 
By agreement between the two Andean 
railways and the railway from Buenos Aires to 
ttie Pacific (three British companies), combined 
tariffs were established between Los Andes 
and Buenos Aires, based on the compensated 
distances on each section, but the tariff for 
livestock was not calculated on the same basis. 
As a result of these agreements, the breakdown 
of charges for some typical products, expressed 
in Chilean currency per metric ton in a full 
wagon, was as follows: 
Products 
From Chile to Argentina: 
Beans 
Cement 
Wine in casks 
Wine in bottles 
From Argentina to Chile: 
Wheat 
Cotton seed 
Sheep (per head) 



























































Source: Marín Vicuña, Política ferroviaria de la América, op. cit., p. 49. 
Simón and others, op. cit., p. 36. 
Although the tariffs reflected the agree-
ment on the splitting of freight between the two 
sides of the trans-Andean railway, anomalies 
persisted which impeded rational use of the 
international section. Thus, for example, the 
rate for cement from Mendoza to Buenos Aires 
was comparatively high, since it was equivalent 
to an implicit tariff on Chilean exports of that 
product to the Buenos Aires market. Further-
more, the trans-Andean rate for live cattle was 
very high compared with that for the section 
between Mendoza and Buenos Aires, thus 
lessening the possibility that livestock would 
¡"ibid., p. 35. 
be exported from Mendoza through the port of 
Valparaiso. At all events, the basic problem was 
the freedom of the three British companies to 
fix charges at rates which maximized their own 
profits, without taking into account the effect 
on the development of international trade. 
Between 1916 and 1920, the Ferrocarril 
Transandino Chileno registered operating 
profits in three years and losses in two, but 
even the profits fell for short of what was 
required to cover the interest on the capital, and 
the Chilean Government guarantee came into 
force. Moreover, since this guarantee covered a 
period of only 20 years, it would expire step by 
step in 1926,1928 and 1930, and when it expired 
completely the company would go bankrupt as 
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a result of its inability to pay interest to the 
holders of the bonds, to whom the railway was 
mortgaged. In anticipation of this possibility, 
the company approached the Chilean Govern-
ment with a view to avoiding such a disastrous 
eventuality. The Government, too, wished to 
avoid the bankruptcy of the company, and was 
also very anxious to change the form in which 
the two Andean companies were administered, 
considering that they would work better under 
unified control. 
As a result of these approaches, in which 
the Argentine section and the Government of 
Argentina also participated, the Chilean Gov-
ernment proclaimed law N.° 3803 of Sep-
tember 1921, which represents a classic 
example of the skills of firms from outside the 
continent in their negotiations with Latin 
American governments. Instead of allowing 
the Chilean Guarantee on interest to expire, 
as was laid down in law N.° 1588 of February 
1903, the new law authorized the issue of Chi-
lean State bonds which would be exchanged 
for the railway bonds, with the annual amount 
of interest exactly equal to the former guarantee, 
but including amortization of 1% a year. In 
turn, the preference shares were converted 
into ordinary shares, and 70% of them were 
transferred to the Government of Chile. Fur-
thermore, the company was authorized to issue 
new bonds for a total amount of £ 500,000, with 
State-guaranteed interest of 7.5%, which would 
be invested in electrifying the line, paying off 
bank debts and improving protective works. 
Finally, the law laid down a basis for the unified 
administration of the two Andean sections in 
the following terms: 
"5. The Company understakes to unify previ-
ously, under the corresponding agreement, 
the administration of its railway with the ad-
ministration of the Ferrocarril Transandino 
Argentino in order to provide services jointly as 
if there was a single company. The lines will be 
unified in agreement with the President of the 
Republic, who shall be authorized to concert 
with the Argentine Government regulations 
concerning the exchange of traffic and the role 
the two Governments will have in fixing 
charges."85 
^Símón and others, op. cit., pp. 46-47. 
The report to the Ministry of Communi-
cations to which reference has been made sums 
up this episode in the following terms; 
"... as far as the trans-Andean railway is con-
cerned, the State has done nothing butmaintain, 
with its own budget resources, the life of a 
company which would have disappeared many 
years ago if abandoned to itself. This drain on 
the National Budget has not benefited either 
trade or production, but merely the holders of 
the bonds and the financial agents of the Com-
pany."86 
It may be argued that the Chilean Govern-
ment had paid too high a price in its eagerness 
to institute a single administration for both 
sections of the Trans-Andean Railway. How-
ever, at least it received in return an opportu-
nity, as owner of 70% of the ordinary shares, to 
impose its will and ensure that the railway was 
administered bearing in mind the national 
interest. Unfortunately, this did not result 
either. 
In January 1922 the Compañía del Ferro-
carril Transandino Chileno and the Compañía 
del Ferrocarril Transandino Argentino con-
cluded an agreement on the unified adminis-
tration of both companies, which was endorsed 
by the Chilean Government in February of the 
same year. Under this agreement a Joint Com-
mittee, composed of equal numbers of dele-
gates from the boards of each of the two 
companies, was set up to appoint the General 
Manager of the unified lines and carry out all 
functions related to operations previously held 
by the two boards. Specifically, the rolling-
stock and locomotives of both companies were 
to be used jointly, and the charges would be 
fixed by the Joint Committee. In order to put 
the agreement into effect, the Ferrocarril Trans-
andino Argentino was to regain administration 
of its own line, which till then had been under 
the Ferrocarril de Buenos Aires al Pacífico.87 
Despite the prospects opened up by the 
agreement, the Joint Committee when set up 
was made up of two representatives of the 
Government of Chile, one representative of 
the Government of Argentina, and three rep-
mbid.,p.49. 
Wlbid., pp. 51-53. 
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resentatives of the private shareholders of the 
two companies, so that the Chilean Govern-
ment , instead of three representatives out of 
five, as it had on the board of the Transandino 
Chileno, came to have two representatives out 
of six on the Joint Committee. In addition, there 
was a substantial overlap between the private 
shareholders in the two trans-Andean compa-
nies (the chairman of the board of the Trans-
andino Chileno was a member of the board of 
the Transandino Argentino), so that the rep-
resentatives of the private shareholders tended 
to adopt joint positions. Worse still, the Joint 
Committee set up its headquarters in London, 
so that the Chilean Government could only be 
represented through diplomatic agents in 
London. Finally, almost all the executives 
appointed by the Joint Committee to administer 
the railway were British, with no substantial 
participation either by Chileans or by Argen-
tines. After all the financial sacrifices made by 
the Government of Chile, matters remained as 
before. As the report to the Ministry of Com-
munications said: 
" In this way the administration of the Trans-
andino Chileno, as exercised through the Joint 
Committee, preserved in a national railway all 
the characteristics of a British colonial line."88 
T h e establishment of the Joint Committee, 
with headquarters in London, did not put an 
end to the expenditure incurred by the two 
former boards. More curiously still, while the 
board of the Transandino Chileno and the Joint 
Commit tee were based in London, a three-
member local board with rather vague functions 
was established in Chile. As a consequence of 
this luxuriant proliferation of boards and author-
ities, the administration costs of the Transan-
dino ¿or Chile reached more than Ch$ 557,000 
in 1927, whereas the administration costs of a 
whole zone in the Southern network of the 
Chilean State railways came to only about 
Ch$ 77,000 in the same year. It is also worth 
noting that the Transandino carried some 
40,000 tons of freight and 20,000 passengers, 
whi le the zone of the Southern Network re-
ferred to carried some 500,000 tons of freight 
and 3 million passengers.89 
mbid., p. 60. 
mlbid., pp. 60-64. 
T h e verdict of the report to the Ministry 
of Communications could be no other than the 
following: "In short, the Transandino Chileno 
is really a British railv ay, operated by Britons, 
directed from Great Britain but paid for with 
Chilean capital."90 
Such a situation could not last, and it was 
obvious that the position of the unified company 
was totally anomalous. As the report stated 
several times: 
" In fact, both the Transandino Chileno and 
the Transandino Argentino —standing as they 
do between the major companies, the Ferroca-
rriles del Estado de Chile and the Ferrocarril 
de Buenos Aires al Pacífico— are equivalent 
to a resistance inserted in a circuit carrying 
heavy traffic"91 
Sooner or later the Argentine and Chilean 
sections would be merged with the main rail-
ways of which they were actually branches, 
and this finally was the recommendation made 
in the report to the Ministry of Communica-
tions.92 
Nevertheless, it was clear that purchasing 
the railway would not be easy, especially 
after having saved the company by means of 
the 1921 law. The report to the Ministry stated: 
"If the shares referred to were freely sold on 
the market, the Government could acquire 
them in lots on different dates in order not to 
raise the priée. 
"However , this is not the case; the minority 
shares are controlled by a financial group 
which is ably directed and which has succeeded 
in obtaining benefits from every negotiation 
with the Government of Chile. Furthermore, 
the same group controls a part (we cannot say 
whether it is the majority) of the shares in 
the Transandino Argentino. The resistance, 
accordingly, would be exercised by the two 
Transandinos and against the two Govern-
ments. 
" I t goes without saying that this resistance 
would be exercised only to uphold the price 
of the shares. It is not to be supposed that the 
financial group in question has the slightest 
«Zfcid., p. 76. 
^Ibid., p. 70. 
mIbid., pp. 69-74. 
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interest in ensuring the survival of the compa-
nies out of a simple spirit of international 
philanthropy aimed at encouraging trade be-
tween Chile and Argentina."93 
In May and December 1932 the Transan-
dino Argentino suspended rail services because 
of financial losses,94 and in 1934 steps were 
initiated to transfer both trans-Andean com-
panies to the Governments concerned. The 
negotiations coincided with a break in con-
tinous traffic between 1934 and 1944, after 
an avalanche destroyed a substantial part of 
the track on the Argentine side. In 1935 a 
protocol between the Governments of Argen-
tina and Chile provided for the establishment 
of a committee to study the situation, and 
finally in 1937 the two sections were purchased 
by the respective Governments.95 In 1944, after 
the line had been reopened to continuous 
traffic, the railway between Los Andes and 
Mendoza was in a position to play its proper 
role for the first time. 
VI 
Analysis of possibilities of co-ordinating international 
railway sections 
At the beginning of this work, we wondered 
whether the international sections had ceased 
to have the justification they had when they 
were built If this were the case, then the fact 
that South America had not obtained the 
originally hoped for benefits from these 
sections because it had not ensured proper 
operational and commercial co-ordination of 
its railway services would be merely of 
historical interest On the other hand, if most 
of these sections still have a clear role to play 
today as instruments for integration and 
development, it is obvious not only that it is 
vital to correct the mistake of the past, but that 
it would be irresponsible not to make use of this 
extensive infrastructure which we have 
inherited as a result of the sacrifices of our 
grandfathers. In my view, international railway 
transport does play precisely this role in South 
America, and this explains the fundamental 
meaning of my work. 
In recent years CEPAL has carried out 
various research projects on transport between 
Lima and Buenos Aires, Lima and Sào Paulo 
83lWd.,p.72. 
94Los ferrocarriles internacionales de Sudamérica..., 
op. cit., p. 134. 
and Santiago and Caracas, in co-operation with 
other regional bodies.5'6 These studies have 
made it clear that in comparison with shipping, 
international land transport offers clear 
advantages to exporters and importers of a 
wide range of goods. Two factors which have 
become important only in recent decades 
underline the role of land transport in the 
Southern Cone: firstly, the growing trade 
within Latin America in manufactured products 
of higher unit value than the commodities 
which traditionally dominated the area's trade, 
and secondly, the growing importance of certain 
poles of development in the interior of the 
continent, such as Santa Cruz, Salta and 
Corumbá. 
To give a single example of the potential 
of land transport, table 1 outlines the compara-
tive costs of the transport of copper by sea, by 
road and by rail between Rancagua and Sâo 
^Ibid; p. 135; Proyectos multinacionales de infra-
estructura física..., op. cit., p. 231. 
^See "Servicios de transporte terrestre internacional 
en los corredores Lima-Buenos Aires y Lima-Sáo Paulo" 
(E/CEPAL/1007) and "Perspectivas del transporte inter-
nacional por carretera en la subregión andina" (E/CEPAL/ 
L.154andAdd. land2) . 
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Paulo. As can be seen, the lowest-cost option 
is B.4, exclusively using railways from Ranca-
gua to Sao Paulo via Las Cuevas, while the 
most expensive is the option using road 
transport for the whole journey. All the 
multimodal options which used railways cost 
less than the multimodal option using ship-
ping.^ 
Table I 
SOME ALTERNATIVES FOR TRANSPORTING COPPER FROM RANCAGUA TO SAO PAULO 
(Cost breadkdown of the MTE and transport times) 






















By sea: A Rancagua-San Antonio, by rail1 
Transshipment in San Antonio 
San Antonio-Santos, by sea 
Transshipment in Santos 
Merchant navy tax (20% of sea freight charge) 
Port improvement tax (3% of cif value at 
US« 1,495/ton.) 
Customs clearance in Santos 
Santos-Sao Paulo (customer's warehouse) by road 40 
By land: B. 1 Rancagua-Mendoza, by road (including trans-
shipment in Mendoza) 50.00 
Mendoza-Buenos Aires, by rail2 "1 
Transshipment in Buenos Aires ^ 44.00 
Buenos Aires-Uruguaiana, by rail3 J 
Transshipment in Umguaiana 2.00 
Customs clearance in Uruguaiana 2.00 
Uruguaiana-Barra Funda, by rail4 25.00 
Transshipment in Barra Funda 2.00 
Barra Funda-Sâo Paulo (customer's warehouse), 
by road 5.00 130.00 18 
B.2 Rancagua-Osorno, by rail1 15.00 
Transshipment in Osomo 2.00 
Osorno-Bariloche, by road 25.00 
Transshipment in Bariloche 2.00 
Customs formalities in Bariloche 2.00 
Bariloche-Buenos Aires, by rail5 ~] 
Transshipment in Buenos Aires > 52.00 
Buenos Aires-Uruguaiana, by rail3 J 
Transshipment in Uruguaiana 2,00 
Customs clearence in Uruguaiana 2.00 
Uruguaiana-Barra Funda, by rail4 25.00 
Transshipment in Barra Funda 2.00 
Barra Funda-Sao Paulo (customer's warehouse) 
by road 5.00 134,00 21 
9 7 Three taxes are included in shipping costs: the 3% 
tax on freight levied by the Caja de Previsión de la Marina 
Mercante d e Chile, which is included in the shipping 
tariff in table 1; the additional freight tax for the renewal 
of the Brazilian Merchant Fleet, equivalent to 20% of the 
value of the cargo imported; and the Brazilian port im-
provement tax, equivalent to 3 % of the cif value of the 
goods. 
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B.3 Rancagua-Soeompa, by rail6 
Socompa-Sa:ita Fo, by rail7 
Santa Fe-Paraná, by road (including transshipment) 
Paraná-Uruguaíana, by rail3 
Transshipment in Uruguaiana 
Customs clearance in Uruguaiana 
Uruguaiana-Barra Funda, by rail4 
Transshipment in Barra Funda 
Barra Funda-Sâo Paulo 







5.00 126.00 25 
B.4 Rancagua-Las Cuevas, by rail8 
Las Cuevas-Mendoza, by rail7 
Transshipment in Mendoza 
Mendoza-Buenos Aires, by rail2 
Transshipment in Buenos Aires 
Buenos Aires-Uruguaiana, by rail3 
Transshipment in Uruguaiana 
Customs clearance in Uruguaiana 
Uruguaiana-Barra Funda, by rail4 
Transshipment in Barra Funda 
Barra Funda-Sào Paulo 









5.00 116.50 23 
B.5 Rancagua-Sao Paulo (customer's warehouse), 
by road 170.00 170.00 12 
1 Ferrocarriles del Estado de Chile, 1.676-m gauge. 
2Ferrocarril General San Martin, 1.676-m gauge. 
•'Ferrocarril General Urquiza, 1.435-m gauge. 
4 Redo Ferroviaria Federal S.A. and Ferrovias Paulistas S.A. (both 1.080-m gauge). 
5Ferrocarril General Rosa, 1.676 -̂m gauge. 
^Ferrocarriles del Estado de Chile, 1.676-m gauge between Raneagua and Calera and 1.000-m gauge between Calera 
and Socompa, In Calera the bogies of the wagons are changed. 
7Ferrocarril General Belgrano, 1.000-m gauge. 
HFerrocarriles del Estado de Chile, 1.676-m gauge between Raneagua and Los Andes and 1.000-m gauge between Los 
Andes and Las Cuevas (inside ot end of tunnel), In Los Andes the bogies of the wagons are changed. 
These same studies show that the potential 
of the physical infrastructure, built with 
enourmous efforts which are a tribute to the 
engineering skills and industrious ne s s of 
South Americans, will remain unused until 
men emerge who are prepared, with the same 
imagination which was manifested during the 
construction of the routes, to embark on the 
ardous task of joining forces to eliminate the 
administrative barriers to the creation of the 
institutional infraestincture which is essential 
if international railway services are to begin 
to operate as they should. In this way we can 
prove that the expectations suggested by 
intuition are correct: small investments 
—added to large doses of goodwill and soli-
darity— will suffice to overcome some prob-
lems standing in the way of the operation of 
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such services which have not yet been solved 
because of insufficient willingness to undertake 
joing action. 
Traditionally, international railway trans-
port has been characterized by the transfer 
of responsibility at the moment of passing the 
freight wagon on at the point of connexion 
be tween the routes of two separately adminis-
tered companies. In this way, international rail 
transport is equivalent to the sum of the 
national transport services of two or more 
interconnected companies. This type of service 
must compete in the international market 
with such means as road transport, where the 
truck covers the entire route under the respon-
sibility of a single carrier, as is also the case 
with sea and air transport. 
Some studies of the factors affecting 
demand for international transport services 
have demonstrated that this demand is deter-
mined by the cost of transport and by the 
quality of service throughout the journey. 
T h e users demand that the transport company 
should solve all the problems which arise in 
moving the goods from the point of origin to 
the point of destination. Door-to-door transport 
service is much more important to users in 
international transport than in national trans-
port. Hence the greater importance of co-
ordination in order to arrange an international 
transport service. 
In view of the fact that the services required 
by international trafile on international rail 
routes will continue to be provided within each 
country by the same companies which are 
responsible for national traffic, and that in most 
cases international traffic is of only marginal 
importance to them, it is necessary to analyse 
the requirements for co-ordination between 
these companies at least at the three following 
levels: 
(a) Operational co-ordination, which in-
cludes agreements on itineraries, exchange of 
wagons, transshipment, documentation, and so 
on, and which might be viewed as a question of 
facilitation, in other words the elimination of 
physical or administrative obstacles to the 
expeditious movements of wagons in inter-
national traffic; 
(b) Commercial co-ordination, which re-
lates essentially to relations with the users, the 
aim being to enable a customer to solve all his 
problems through a single company without 
having to deal separately with each company 
involved. This co-ordination should include 
agreements on the harmonization of freight 
classifications, the fixing of charges, single 
payment of charges for the entire journey, sales 
promotion, complaints services, and so on; 
(c) Co-ordination of programmes and 
plans which aim at sharing work on the design 
and implementation of investment projects 
required to improve the operation of the inter-
national sections. 
In 1964, at the initiative of the railway 
companies of the Southern Cone of South 
America, whose networks make up an inter-
national railway system, the Latin American 
Railways Association (ALAF) was set up for the 
purpose of "promoting safe, efficient and 
economic railway transport; stimulating trade 
by railway; and ensuring the co-ordination and 
progress of Latin American railways and railway 
industries, as a means of achieving social and 
economic integration for the benefit of the 
peoples of Latin America".98 
Until the establisment of ALAF, the rail-
ways were inmersed in their local problems, 
and possibilities of co-ordination between them 
were minimal. From the outset ALAF has 
attached the greatest importance to promoting 
international rail transport and, with the aim of 
institutionalizing its work in this direction, it 
established the Zonal Groups, first binational in 
nature, and later multinational, as required. The 
periodic work of these Zonal Groups is a 
typical example of co-operation among devel-
oping countries, and has offered an opportunity 
for contacts between railway executives at the 
highest level, so that they can undertake the task 
of co-ordinating international rail traffic. 
Under the sponsorship and co-ordination of 
ALAF, there has been a vast increase in the 
meetings of Zonal Groups to analyse the opera-
tional problems of all the international railway 
connexions in order to improve the transport 
services offered to users, thus makingitpossible 
to tackle in the field a series of measures ranging 
9 8Statute of the Latin American Railways Association, 
art. 2. 
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from co-ordination of itineraries and work on 
border interchange stations to the leasing of 
traction equipment between connected net-
works in order to facilitate the operation of 
trains. For some connexions, such as those 
between Arica and La Paz, and between Los 
Andes and Mendoza, ALAF has encouraged the 
railways concerned to co-operate in carrying out 
comprehensive studies designed to improve 
the co-ordination of services and the carrying 
capacity, although the results are still limited. 
As a result of the action of these Groups, the 
traffic agreements between the railways have 
been improved, and under the direction of 
ALAF a model agreement has been prepared 
to guide the modification and adjustment of the 
standards governing bilateral traffic, with a 
view to standardization. 
An experiment in transcontinental trans-
port carried out in 1974 as part of a joint project 
by CEPAL and the Instituto para la Integración 
de América Latina (INTAL), with the co-
operation of ALAF and the railway companies of 
Chile, Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil, demon-
strated the technical feasibility of this type of 
transport between Antofagasta and Sâo Paulo, 
but there remained a clear need for institutional 
agreements regulating multinational railway 
transport. Under the direction and co-ordi-
nation of ALAF, and with advisory services from 
CEPAL and the experience and firm determi-
nation of the railway companies of Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay, the Agreement on Multinational 
Freight Transport by Rail, known as the 
MULTILAF Agreement, was drawn up and is 
now fully in force, although some temporary 
restrictions still remain. 
As regards concrete progress in inter-
national transport since the establishment of 
ALAF, there has been a very substantial in-
crease in transport on various international rail 
links, particularly between Bolivia and Brazil 
and between Afgentina and Brazil. It is also 
possible to note an interesting flow of copper 
traffic by rail from Chile to Brazil through 
Argentina, which has demonstrated the tech-
nical and economic feasibility of transconti-
nental rail transport over distances of more than 
4,000 km in competition with other forms of land 
and sea transport. 
The active and growing competition pro-
vided by road transport for international railways 
today means that the position of the latter is 
much more difficult than it was 50 years ago. 
Nevertheless, the present determination to 
ensure the essential co-operation and co-ordi-
nation among national companies in neigh-
bouring countries opens up better prospects 
than in the past for more effective exploitation of 
the inherent advantages of railways in inter-
national traffic. If this preparedness and deter-
mination had existed at the right time in the 
past, the economic history of the subregion 
would have been different, and regional inte-
gration would have been a reality at a time 
when some visionaries looked forward to it as a 
dream of the future. 
The creation of ALAF has led to a 
profound change in the attitude of the railways 
to international rail traffic. The repercussions 
cannot yet be assessed in the absence of a 
historical perspective, but it is very likely that in 
coming years the history of international rail-
ways in South America will be divided up into 
two periods: before ALAF and after ALAF. 
